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New York has been remarkably successful relative to any other large city 
outside of the sunbelt and it remains the nation’s premier metropolis. What 
accounts for New York’s rise and continuing success?  The rise of New 
York in the early nineteenth century is the result of technological changes 
that moved ocean shipping from a point-to-point system to a hub and 
spoke system; New York’s geography made it the natural hub of this 
system.  Manufacturing then centered in New York because the hub of a 
transport system is, in many cases, the ideal place to transform raw 
materials into finished goods.  This initial dominance was entrenched by 
New York’s role as the hub for immigration.  In the late 20
th century, New 
York’s survival is based almost entirely on finance and business services, 
which are also legacies of the port.  In this period, New York’s role as a 
hub still matters, but it is far less important than the edge that density and 
agglomeration give to the acquisition of knowledge.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
For 200 years, New York City has been the largest city in the nation, and it continues to 
outperform most cities that were once its competitors.  In the 1990s, the city’s population 
grew by 9 percent and finally passed the eight million mark.  New York is the only one of 
the 16 largest cities in the northeastern or mid-western United States with a higher 
population today than it had 50 years ago.   New York’s economy remains robust.  
Payroll per employee is more than $80,000 per year in Manhattan’s largest industry and 
almost $200,000 per year in Manhattan’s second largest industry.  
 
All cities, even New York, go through periods of crisis and seeming rebirth, and New 
York certainly went through a real crisis in the 1970s.  But while the dark periods for 
Boston, Chicago or Washington D.C. lasted for thirty or fifty years, New York’s worst 
period lasted for less than a decade.  While Boston’s history is one of ongoing crises and 
reinvention (Glaeser, 2005), New York’s history is one of almost unbroken triumph.  The 
remarkable thing about New York is its ability to thrive despite the massive technological 
changes that challenged every other dense city that was built around public 
transportation.   
 
What explains New York’s ongoing ability to dominate America’s urban landscape?  In 
this essay, I explore the economic history of the city and argue that there are really three 
themes that emerge.  First, New York’s emergence as the nation’s premier port was not 
the result of happenstance followed by lemming-like agglomeration.   While there are 
limits to geographic determinism, the clear superiority of New York’s port both in its 
initial depth, the Hudson River and its location, and then the additional superiority added 
by the water-borne connection to the Great Lakes ensured that this would be America’s 
port.  In this case, geography really was destiny and the significance of trade and 
immigration to the early republic ensured that New York would dominate. 
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The second lesson from New York’s history is the importance of simple transportation 
cost and scale economies.  The rise of New York’s three great manufacturing industries 
in the 19
th century, sugar refining, publishing and the garment trade, depended on New 
York’s place at the center of a transport hub.  In all three cases, manufacturing 
transformed products from outside of the U.S. into finished goods that would be sold 
within the country.  Since New York was a hub and products were dispersed throughout 
the country and the world after entry into that hub, it made perfect sense to do the 
manufacturing in the city.   
 
The tendency of people to attract more people is the central idea of urban economics, and 
nowhere is that more obvious than in the case of America’s largest city.  An initial 
advantage as a port then attracted manufacturing and services to cater to the mercantile 
firms and to take advantage of their low shipping costs.  The traditional model of this 
phenomenon (Krugman, 1991) emphasizes that scale matters because it allows 
manufacturers to save on costs in supplying goods to residents of the city.  But the story 
of New York suggests that this was less important than the advantage of producing in a 
central location for export elsewhere.  Obviously, scale economies were also important 
because otherwise, there would be no incentive to centralize manufacturing 
 
New York’s growth in the early 19
th century was driven by the rise of manufacturing in 
the city which itself depended on the city’s primacy as a port.  New York’s growth in the 
late 19
th century owed at least as much to its role as the entryway for immigrants into the 
U.S.  Indeed, the basic industrial structure of New York remained remarkably consistent 
between 1860 and 1910 while the scale increased enormously.  Immigrants stayed in 
New York in port for “consumption” reasons.  Ethnic neighborhoods made the transition 
to the new world easier and New York as a city acquired over time a remarkable capacity 
to cater to immigrant needs.  However, the immigrants also stayed because the traditional 
New York industries (especially the garment industry) were able to increase in scale to 
accommodate extra labor without a huge drop in wages.   
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In the middle 20
th century a large number of technological changes challenged cities 
throughout the United States.  Declining transport costs reduced the advantages of access 
to waterways.  The air conditioner helped move citizens west and south.  The automobile 
and the truck enabled the population to disperse from city centers to outlying areas.  
Almost all of America’s biggest cities declined, and sometimes declined precipitously 
over the past 50 years in response to the shock.  Table 1 shows that eight of the ten 
largest cities in the U.S. in 1930 have a lower population today than they did then.   New 
York and Los Angeles are the two exceptions.   
 
New York’s remarkable survival is a result of its dominance in the fields of finance, 
business services and corporate management.   Forty years ago, Chinitz (1961) described 
New York as a model of diversity in comparison with industrial Pittsburgh.  New York in 
2005 doesn’t look nearly as diverse. 28 percent of Manhattan’s payroll goes to workers in 
a single three-digit industry.  56 percent of Manhattan’s payroll goes to workers in four 
three-digit industries.  New York’s 20
th century success primarily reflects its ability to 
attract and retain a single industry, and its future appears related to a continuing ability to 
hold that industry.   
 
The attraction of finance and business services to New York reflects the advantages of 
the city in facilitating face-to-face contact and the spread of information.  Transportation 
costs for goods have declined by 95 percent over the 20
th century (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 
2004), but there is no comparable reduction in the cost of moving people.  After all, the 
primary cost involved in the movement of people is the opportunity cost of time, which 
rises with wages.  For this reason, cities, which represent the elimination of physical 
distance between people, still excel in delivering services.   In addition, as the demand for 
timely information rises, the proximity which facilitates that flow of that information 
continues to be critical.  The success of finance and business services on the island of 
Manhattan hinges critically on the advantage that the island has in bringing people 
together and speeding the flow of knowledge.  
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These advantages are the result of scale and density which are themselves the result of 
New York’s unique history.  The vast number of people crammed together on a narrow 
island is what makes Manhattan an information hub.  The flow of ideas has been 
exacerbated by the tendency of highly skilled people and industries to locate in the city, 
which is natural, given that density and idea flows appear to complement one another.  
The most visible result of New York’s strength as a conduit for information is its 
penchant for information-intensive industries, like finance or publishing, to locate in the 
city.    
  
While New York’s ability to weather past challenges has been remarkable, we cannot be 
certain that its future success will remain assured.  New York’s importance as a port is 
long past.  Declining transport costs for moving goods indicates that the scale advantages 
remain important only in services.  Even in this area, technological changes may reduce 
New York’s transportation cost advantages.  In the long run, New York City’s success 
depends upon its advantage in transmitting knowledge quickly.  This advantage may also 
be eroded by changes in information technology, but in the short run, information 
technology may increase the value of face-to-face interaction and make New York 
stronger, not weaker (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998).    
 
II.  The Early City: 1624-1790 
 
The traditional story of New York’s origin is that in 1626, the island of Manhattan was 
bought by Peter Minuit from the Lenapes for “sixty guilders worth of trade goods” 
(Burrows and Wallace, 1999, p. 23).  New Amsterdam was founded by the Dutch West 
India Company as a trading post oriented towards the lucrative fur trade.   As Burrows 
and Wallace (1999, p. 23) explain, the fur trade involved two exchanges: “In the first, 
European traders and coastal Algonkians exchanged manufactured goods for wampum; in 
the second, European traders used wampum (and manufactured goods) to obtain first at 
Fort Orange [Albany].”   Manhattan’s location—a deep-water port at the heart of the 
Hudson—made it an ideal center for commerce, connecting Europeans, coastal native 
Americans who dealt in Wampum and upriver native Americans who had access to furs.     6
 
Manufacturing had a place in New York, from its inception.  An essential part of the 
trade with the natives was the production of manufactured goods and these were cheaper 
to produce in New Amsterdam than to import from the Netherlands.  Agglomeration in a 
city was natural both because of the gains from centralized commerce and also because 
there was substantial risk from ongoing battles with natives.  A significant advantage of 
lower Manhattan was that because it was surrounded on three sides by water, it was 
easier to defend.   
 
The Dutch colonies of New Netherlands were not solely fur trading outposts.  Land was 
abundant and a steady stream of settlers acquired land (sometimes vast tracts of it like 
Rensselaerswyck) and began producing basic agricultural products like bread, corn and 
meat.  The density of settlers was much lower than in Massachusetts, but gradually the 
New Amsterdam area also developed an agricultural hinterland that could both feed the 
traders and seamen in the city and also begin to export basic foodstuff to more colonies 
that exported cash crops.   
 
In 1664, the town was conquered by the English and renamed New York.  The city was 
conquered, but the English were only able to keep the city by giving the Dutch West 
India Company the more lucrative colony of Surinam.  The integration of New York with 
the English colonies increased the potential for trading opportunities and the population 
of the city surged to approximately 3,000 in 1680 (Burrows and Wallace, 1999) and 
5,000 in 1698 (Kantrowitz, 1995).  While many Dutch merchants continued to trade with 
the Netherlands and the Dutch colonies, a growing group of English merchants and 
laborers came to the city as well.    
 
During this period, New York’s trade became primarily oriented towards the West Indies.  
The primary exports of the port were bread and flour, made from wheat grown in the 
farms of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey.  This model of selling foodstuffs to the 
colonies which had cash crops that could be sold back in Europe had been pioneered by 
Bostonians in the late 1630s, but New Yorkers (and Philadelphians) had several   7
significant advantages over the Boston merchants.  The land in New York and 
Pennsylvania was better than the land in Massachusetts.  The Hudson and Delaware 
rivers were longer, bigger rivers than the Charles.  Indeed, the one long river in New 
England, the Connecticut, suffered from heavy silt that formed a sandbar near its mouth.  
New York’s Dutch heritage gave it an advantage over Philadelphia in dealing with the 
Dutch colonies in the Caribbean.   
 
New York also offered one more striking advantage over Boston: its ethnic heterogeneity 
and religious tolerance.  Boston’s puritan heritage carried both advantages and 
disadvantages.  The strong religious community invested in education and generally 
proved able to organize the city and provide basic public goods.  Quaker Philadelphia 
may have been more tolerant than Puritan Boston but it was still fundamentally a faith-
based colony.  By contrast, New York was irreligious from the start, and there were fewer 
barriers against Jewish or Catholic immigrants.  Commercial interests ensured that New 
York City was unusually tolerant both relative to other colonies and relative to England, 
itself.  New York’s place as a haven for America’s ethnically heterogeneous immigrants 
made the city a magnet for immigrants from its earliest years.  
 
Despite these advantages, the growth of New York during its first 130 years was 
relatively modest.  Generally, New York was America’s third or fourth busiest port.  In 
tonnage, it lagged behind Boston and Charleston in the early 18
th century and behind 
Boston and Philadelphia in the late colonial period.   Boston had a stronger maritime 
tradition; Philadelphia had a more developed hinterland.  As of 1753, Manhattan had 
13,000 inhabitants making it one of the colonies bigger cities, but hardly a dominant 
metropolis.   
 
The French and Indian War ended the French presence in Canada and increased the 
relative value of New York’s access through the Hudson to the north.  The Revolutionary 
War had an even more remarkable impact on New York City.  The port was the only 
large city that remained in British hands throughout the war.  While combat was certainly 
disruptive, the port’s activity also expanded as it provided entry and exit for military men   8
and material.  Perhaps just as importantly, Boston and Philadelphia’s long term 
reputations as centers of revolution meant that New York would end up being the 
preferred delivery point for British goods coming into the new republic.   
  
As of 1786, Manhattan had 23,614 residents.  In the first American census, the city of 
New York had 33,131 residents.  Over the entire 1698-1786 period, the population of 
Manhattan had grown by 1.8 percent annually.  This increase is impressive, but 
ultimately far less impressive than the growth of Philadelphia over the same time period.  
Even though New York was larger than Philadelphia in 1790, Philadelphia was a newer 
city and it had been bigger than New York for many years during the 18
th century.   
When the constitution was signed is 1789, New York was an important port, but its rise 
to dominance was still ahead. 
 
III.  The Rise to Dominance: 1790-1860 
 
If the growth of New York City prior to 1790 was impressive, the growth over the 
seventy years after that date was nothing short of spectacular.  Figure 1 shows the growth 
of New York City’s population since 1790 and the growth of Manhattan’s population 
since 1900.  Figure 2 shows the growth of New York City and Manhattan as a share of 
the U.S. population.  Between 1790 and 1860, New York City’s population rose from 
33,131 to 813,669.  The annual rate of increase rose from 1.8 percent to 4.7 percent.  
Figure 3 shows the time path of the decadal growth rates of New York City.  During 
every decade, except that war-torn period between 1810 and 1820, New York grew by 
more than 50 percent per decade.  Except for the period when New York’s population 
soared due to the incorporation of Brooklyn, it would never grow by comparable rates 
again.   
 
By 1860, New York was far and away the biggest and most important city in the United 
States with almost 250,000 residents more than Philadelphia.  Over the 140 years since 
that date, New York’s preeminence among American cities has never been challenged.    9
In a sense, the key to understanding New York’s tremendous success lies in 
understanding this seventy year period.  
 
There are two distinct, but closely related growth processes that occurred over this time 
period.  First, the port of New York came to completely dominate American shipping and 
immigration.  Second, New York exploded as a manufacturing town as industries like 
sugar, publishing and most importantly the garment trade clustered around the port.  The 
growth of New York City’s port seems like an almost inevitable result of New York’s 
clear geographic advantages (especially when nature was helped along by the Erie 
Canal).  The growth of manufacturing in the city informs us about the nature of 
agglomeration economies and transportation costs. 
 
Albion (1970) describes the increased use of New York City as a dumping ground for 
European goods.  The Napoleonic wars (and the War of 1812) had severely curtailed 
trade between the United States and the United Kingdom.  As soon as peace was 
declared, British merchantmen with millions of dollars of goods hastened to America to 
finally sell these wares.  The merchantmen packed large ships and came to New York to 
drop their wares, which were then shipped throughout the republic.  This basic pattern 
was to be the model for trade with Europe over the 19
th and early 20
th centuries.   
 
At the end of the colonial period, Boston, not New York, was America’s premier port.   
Between 1790 and1820, New York came to supercede Boston and ultimately attracted a 
large number of Boston merchants and sailors into its harbor.  From 1820 to 1860, New 
York completely surpassed its northern competition in terms of trade.  Figure 4 shows the 
time path of annual imports measured in dollars between 1821 and 1860.  At the start of 
the period, New York’s exports were 13 million dollars and Boston’s were 12 million 
dollars.  By the end of the period, New York’s exports were 145 million dollars and 
Boston’s exports were 17 million dollars.  As the figure shows, it was New Orleans, not 
Boston or Philadelphia, that rivaled New York City by the middle of the 19
th century.   
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What changed?  Why had the harbors of Boston and Philadelphia been good enough to be 
the leading port of the colonial era, but not enough to maintain their strength over the 19
th 
century?  There are actually two different sets of answers to this question.  First, there are 
the technical facts that make New York a somewhat superior port.  Second, there are the 
economic factors that translated this modest geographic superiority into complete 
mercantile dominance.  I start with New York’s geographic advantages.    
 
A first advantage is New York’s central location.  While Boston is at the northern edge of 
the United States, New York is in the center.  For ships from England and elsewhere that 
were trying to make a single delivery to the colonies, New York offered a better location 
since it would be cheaper to ship goods from New York to the southern colonies or 
Philadelphia than from Boston.  One of the great advantages of the Constitution over the 
Articles of Confederation is that the Constitution greatly reduced the barriers to interstate 
trade.  As these barriers fell, the possibility for interstate trade increased and the 
advantage of being located near the center of the colonies increased. 
 
A second advantage was that New York had a large river that facilitated shipping deep 
into the American continent.  The Charles River quickly becomes narrow and shallow 
and is less than 100 miles long.  The Hudson is longer than 300 miles and is extremely 
navigable.  The Erie Canal connects the Hudson to the Great Lake system, which enables 
goods to travel from the American heartland to Europe completely by water.  In an age 
where water-borne transport was far cheaper than transport by land, New York’s access 
to canals, lakes and rivers gave it a significant edge relative to most of its competitors.  
 
Philadelphia shared some of New York’s advantages of centrality and water access to the 
interior.  Of course, Philadelphia’s connection with Pittsburgh and the west used both rail 
and water and as such was decidedly more difficult than New York’s pure water 
connection.  Moreover, New York enjoys a third advantage which Philadelphia does not 
have: direct access to the ocean.  The port of Philadelphia is more than 100 miles from 
the Atlantic whereas the port of New York is less than 20 miles from the ocean.  As such, 
a European ship looking to save time and money would naturally be attracted to New   11
York.  The ports along the Chesapeake Bay, such as Baltimore, also suffered from a 
greater distance to the ocean.   
 
Finally, New York’s port is also superb in its combination of depth, shelter and freedom 
from ice.  New York harbor is protected from the ocean by Staten Island and the 
Brooklyn peninsula.  It is much deeper than the harbor of Boston or Philadelphia and this 
became increasingly important as ship tonnage increased starting in the 1790s.  Finally, 
New York harbor is less prone to ice than either Boston or Philadelphia.  The advantage 
over Philadelphia occurs because despite Philadelphia’s more southern locale, its location 
on a river means that its water freezes more readily.   
 
These advantages were significant, but they only implied that New York would be the 
first among equals.  The remarkable dominance that the city had over America’s exports 
needs more explanation.  Why did New York end up having five or six times the exports 
of Boston in 1860 and 25 times the exports of Philadelphia in the same year?  This 
question lies at the essence of the agglomeration economies that lie behind cities.   
 
The rise of New York City as the dominant port can be seen as an early example of a 
hub-and-spoke transportation network.  In the earliest period of colonial history, the 
dominant form of transportation between the new world and the old consisted of point-to-
point transport where bales of tobacco were picked up in Virginia and transported to 
England.  But point-to-point transport was plagued with the problem that the exporting 
areas did not import anywhere near enough goods from England to fill the ships on their 
voyage to the Americas.  First, the southern plantation owners generally maintained a 
large current account surplus which was offset either by capital accumulation or by 
paying debts on the purchase of land and slaves.  Second, the manufactured goods that 
were important from the old world used much less space than the tobacco or cotton that 
was exported.  Third, the southern plantation owners found it increasingly efficient to buy 
from new world producers of manufactured goods or food and avoid the lengthy Atlantic 
trip.   
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The lack of southern imports is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows imports and exports 
out of New York and New Orleans.  Throughout the 1821-1860 period, the New York 
harbor imported more than it exported.  This pattern reflected the general tendency of 
America to run a current account deficit which was offset by shipments of bullion back to 
the old world.  Throughout the same time period, New Orleans maintained a staggering 
current account surplus.  By 1860, New Orleans exported 107 million dollars worth of 
goods and imported 22 million dollars worth of goods.  In a sense, this lack of balance 
made it somewhat amazing that New Orleans’ port could thrive as an export market, 
despite the enormous advantage of being at the mouth of the Mississippi.   
 
This lack of coincidence of wants was solved in the 18
th century, by the early triangle 
trade where manufactured goods in England were brought to Africa and traded for slaves, 
which were in turn brought to the Caribbean and the South.  The ships reloaded with 
plantation produce which was then brought to England.  But this triangle could hardly 
survive the elimination of the slave trade in 1808.  Moreover, the elimination of the slave 
trade coincided with an enormous increase in the production of cotton following Eli 
Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin in 1794.  At the same time as the South had more 
and more to export, importation of slaves became illegal.   
 
The “cotton triangle” in New York City solved this problem.  Cotton was shipped to New 
York and was transferred from coastal ships to transatlantic lines.  Manufactured goods, 
often made in the city went south.  Ships coming to New York were filled with imported 
goods from the old world.  Ships leaving New York were filled with cotton and other 
basic commodities being shipped east.  While the New York port of the 18
th century had 
focused on shipping flour grown in the vicinity of the harbor, the port of the 19
th century 
became a conduit through which a large amount of the entire colonies trade would pass.   
 
The “cotton triangle” is just one example of New York becoming a hub connecting two 
spokes.  Obviously, New York also connected the river, lake and canal traffic from the 
west with the transatlantic ships to the New World.  Tobacco products from the South 
came to New York from Baltimore and other more southern ports.  More surprisingly,   13
New York also served as a hub for goods from Philadelphia and even Boston.  For 
example, Boston textile producers would often ship their wares to New York to be sold in 
that large entrepot to buyers from across the country.  Similarly, Philadelphia shipped 
coal from the Pennsylvania anthracite mines up to Manhattan.   
 
The increasing attractiveness of hub-and-spoke shipping owed much to changes in 
shipping technology.  Two large changes occurred, which both added advantages to 
having a focal port.  First, transatlantic ships became increasingly large over the early 
19
th century.  For example, Albion (1970, p. 398) reports that in 1834, 1950 vessels 
entered into New York harbor carrying 465 thousand tons of cargo.  In 1860, 3982 
vessels entered into the harbor carrying 1983 thousand tons of cargo.  The average 
tonnage per ship entering into the harbor increased from 238 tons of cargo to 498 tons of 
cargo over that 26 year period.  The rise in ship size is particularly clear when 
considering the packet lines that provided regular service from New York to Liverpool.  
In the early 1820s, these ships typically carried between 300 and 400 tons. By 1838, 1000 
tons became normal and the Amazon carried 1771 tons in 1854 (Albion, 1970).   
 
These large ships provided great scale economies in that they required smaller crews per 
ton.  Furthermore, they were generally safer and faster than their smaller predecessors.  
However, this large ship created an indivisibility which makes the gains from a 
centralized port obvious.  While small ships can readily go point-to-point, dropping their 
small cargoes at disparate locations, larger ships needed a market that could accept its 
larger cargoes.  This created a centralizing tendency, just as scale economies and 
indivisibilities do in standard models of economic geography (Krugman, 1991).   This 
effect is exactly parallel to the tendency to use the largest planes only for travel between 
the biggest airports.  These bigger ships also increased the advantage inherent in New 
York’s deeper harbor.  Philadelphia could readily compete in handling the shallow draft 
ships of the 18
th century, however, the Delaware is simply not deep enough to handle 
regular commerce with the largest ships of the 19
th century.   
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The second large change of the 19
th century was increased specialized shipping, which 
was in itself a by-product of the increased use of large ships for transatlantic crossings.  
In a small ship world, the ships that plied the coastal trade and the ships that crossed the 
ocean were not all that different.  However, the rise of big ships meant that it became 
efficient to use different ships to carry goods up and down the American coast and to 
carry goods across the Atlantic.  Small ships are far more appropriate to pick up smaller 
cargoes and carry them on shallower waters.  Big ships had more of a risk of running 
aground and could not be used to pick up the smaller cargoes being shipped to and from 
the disparate settlements of young republic.  Instead, it increasingly made sense to use 
smaller ships, such as schooners, to ply the coastal trade.  These ships would then bring 
their cargoes to New York and then be consolidated into larger cargoes carried in big 
ships for the transatlantic crossing.   
 
These technological advantages were further abetted by learning-by-doing, specialized 
investment in port-related infrastructure and the agglomeration of manufacturing 
(described in the next section).  There is little doubt that New York gradually acquired an 
unequal set of skills and institutions that supported large scale trade.  Its auction houses 
and insurance system became the largest in the Americas.  New York invested in its 
wharves which further enhanced its port.  Indeed, the Erie Canal should be also seen as a 
form of port-related investment that further exacerbated its initial advantages.  As trade 
became more intricate and as financial transactions became larger, gains to specialization 
increased.  As such, the initial advantage that New York had because of its deep harbor 
and central location ultimately translated into massive dominance as a port.  
  
The rise of the New York port is not an illustration of random accident leading to 
geographic concentration.  New York was the best port in the United States and it should 
have been the largest.  However, its rise does show the conditions under which an initial 
advantage, which might have been slight, translates into vast scale.  Probably the most 
important reason for centralization was the mismatch between supply and demand 
especially in the southern colonies.  This mismatch in New York’s case, as in most cases, 
led to the advantages of a large market which eliminate the need for bilateral commodity   15
transactions.  A secondary fact was changes in technology that create larger boats and 
benefit from specialization.  These also created scale economies in the port.  Finally, 
these advantages were further advanced by trade-specific infrastructure and trade-specific 
human capital which became increasingly important in the more complicated world of the 
19
th century.   
 
 The Rise of the Manufacturing City 
 
While the rise of New York City as a port is a striking example of agglomeration 
economies at work, the majority of New York’s burgeoning population was not involved 
either directly in commerce or in the maritime trades.  While Boston specialized in 
seafaring men, New York’s population increasingly engaged in manufacturing.  As early 
as the 1820, New York had 9,523 workers in manufacturing and 3,142 people in 
commerce.  By 1850, there were 43,340 people in manufacturing and 11,360 in 
commerce.  New York’s port may have been the catalyst for the city’s rise, but New 
Yorkers were far more likely to be involved in producing manufactured goods than in 
working on the ships themselves.  
 
Drennan and Matson (1995) include data from the census of manufacturers in various 
decades.  The dominant industries (measured by value) are generally sugar refining, 
printing and publishing and the garment industry.  In the 1810 economic census, sugar 
refining was the largest industry and it was responsible for more than one-third of the 
value of total manufactured products in the city.  In 1870, sugar would be the second 
largest industry (by value) in New York City and the largest industry in Kings County 
(Brooklyn).  Even in 1900, sugar was the second largest industry in New York City.  
Needless to say, sugar’s dominance did not continue into the 20
th century.   
 
The sugar industry began in New York in the 18
th century when Nicholas Bayard opened 
the first sugar refinery in the city in 1730.  Several other refineries followed and in the 
19
th century, the Havemeyers began refining in Brooklyn.  Sugar refining was, certainly   16
relative to the garment industry, highly capital intensive for its days.  These refineries 
were large industrial undertakings that produced vast returns for early industrialists. 
 
New York’s dominant role in the sugar industry resulted from its trade with the West 
Indies which increasingly specialized in sugar production in the 1750s and 1760s.  
During this period, New York flour was shipped down to the Caribbean and raw sugar 
was one of the commodities that returned in the holds of the ships.  This raw sugar would 
then be refined in New York and then consumed in the city, or shipped elsewhere.  This 
pattern would continue after the Revolutionary War where New York’s central role as the 
hub of a trading network meant that sugar passed through the city on its way both to 
Europe and to markets within the United States.  .  
 
But why was New York the natural place to refine sugar?  In principle, sugar could have 
been refined in either the West Indies at the final point of consumption.  In the case of 
some commodities, processing removes so much weight that it is generally efficient to 
engage in this processing at source.  Indeed, even in the case of sugar, it would have been 
madness to ship untouched sugar cane up to New York for processing without first 
turning the sugar cane into raw sugar.  The excess weight would have badly 
compromised profits, and even more importantly, unprocessed sugar cane rots quickly.   
 
While initial processing must be done soon after the cane is cut to avoid rot and close to 
the sugar plantation to avoid carrying excess weight, sugar refining occurs “close to 
where the sugar is to be consumed” (Galloway, 1989, p.17).  Galloway (1998) writes “the 
fundamental reason for the separation of the final stage in the manufacture of sugar – 
refining – from the cane fields, a separation that in the western world dates back several 
hundred years, lies in the fact that crystals of sugar coalesce during the human conditions 
of a long sea voyage, and so any imported refined sugar would have had to have been 
reworked if customers were to have received the top quality.”  Galloway also emphasizes 
the lack of cheap fuel for refining in the tropics and he might have also stressed the high 
cost of labor in the tropics that was skilled enough to run refineries.     17
Sugar refining occurred in North America rather than in the Caribbean because of high 
transport costs, but sugar refining occurred in New York rather than in small towns 
throughout the country because of scale economies.  By the standards of early 19
th 
century industry, sugar refining involved large infrastructure investment and significant 
fixed costs.  Sugar refineries were among the largest factories of this early period.  These 
scale economies meant that it was impractical to spread sugar refineries throughout the 
colonies in every town or village.  The technology of sugar production almost dictated 
that sugar refining occur in a central location close to most centers of consumption, and 
New York City was an ideal central location.   
 
The strength of the sugar industry in New York therefore owes everything to New York’s 
role as a shipping hub connecting Caribbean ports both with the American hinterland and 
with European final consumers.  There are strong enough scale economies in sugar 
refining that it makes sense to centralize, and centralized production is most efficient if it 
occurs in the port through which the sugar is passing anyway.  The growth of sugar 
manufacturing shows a basic pattern for the growth of New York as a manufacturing 
center.  Trade brought raw commodities through the city.  In cases where manufacturing 
in the initial agricultural area was inefficient, but where it made sense to manufacture in a 
single place, then this gateway city was the natural place to create finished products. 
 
While the sugar refining industry produced a great deal of value, it generally only 
included a modest number of New Yorkers.  For example, in 1860, the economic census 
of manufacturers reports that there were 1,494 employees in sugar refining in New York 
City producing more than $19 million dollars worth of products.  By contrast, the 
garment industry employed 26,857 workers in that same year and produced $22,320,769 
worth of products.  From the mid-19
th century through to 1970, the garment trade had 
remained New York City’s dominant manufacturing industry, at least in terms of total 
employment.  In 1860, almost 30 percent of the employment in New York City 
manufacturing was in the garment industry.  In 1900, 19 percent of New York’s 
manufacturing employment was in that sector.  In 1940 and 1967, 27 percent of 
manufacturing employment was in garments.     18
 
New York was generally a diversified economy, but to the extent that one industry has 
dominated the city for a century, it was the garment trade.  The basic economics of the 
19
th century New York garment industry are not so different than the economics of the 
sugar refining industry.  The essence of this industry is turning cloth into clothing. Cloth 
was generally produced in textile mills, either in England or later in the textile mills of 
New England.  As was the case with sugar, cloth and silk came through Manhattan.  
Similarly, there was a strong economic rationale to have manufacturing centered at the 
port of entry.   
 
The starting point for the textile trade was England’s commercial dominance as an 
exporter of wool and cotton cloth.  This dominance was historical, but at the end of the 
18
th century, early industrialization gave English producers a huge advantage in the 
production of textiles.  This advantage, and the general importance of clothing in budgets, 
meant that in the first half of the nineteenth century, “textiles amounted to nearly 60 
percent of England’s domestic exports and about one-third of the imports of the United 
States” (Albion, 1970, p. 58).  This trade increasingly came through New York with the 
city’s dominance of transatlantic shipping.  In 1860, more than 80 percent of the nation’s 
textiles entered through New York.  In the same year, wool, cotton and silk goods 
accounted for 37 percent of the imports coming into the harbor. 
 
England was the only producer sending textiles into America through New York harbor.  
The city was also the entryway for silks from France and even China.  As New England 
mills began production and competed with English producers even they found themselves 
shipping cloth to Manhattan to take advantage of this central market.  The vast flow of 
cloth into Manhattan was the natural result of New York’s dominance as a port and 
textile’s dominance as an item of trade.  
 
In the early part of the 19
th century, this trade did not create a garment industry.  In the 
1810 economic census, New York City had significant tanneries and hatteries, but not a 
significant garment trade.  Fifty years later, the garment industry had become the city’s   19
largest industry.  The big change occurred because of the rise of the ready-to-wear 
industry.  In 1810, cloth was turned into clothing by tailors, seamstresses and by the end 
users themselves.  There weren’t factories for the production of clothes.  When clothes 
where made-to-measure, there was no place for centralized production of garments.  At 
the start of the 19
th century, therefore, New York’s garment industry consisted mainly of 
tailors catering to the local population.   
 
Over the 19
th century, there were both changes in demand and production technology that 
turned New York into a center of ready-to-wear clothes.  On the demand side, the rising 
slave population of the south had a demand for extremely cheap, ready-to-wear clothing.  
George Opdyke began the manufacture of ready-to-wear clothing in New York in 1831, 
catering to the market in New Orleans.  The changes in production technology included 
the development of the factory system and even more importantly, Elias Howe’s 
invention of the sewing machine in 1846.  Mechanization greatly decreased the costs of 
mass production relative to custom tailoring and furthered the rise of the ready-to-wear 
garment industry. 
 
Once such an industry existed, and given that there were substantial scale economies in 
the production of clothes due to machinery and specialized human capital, it is hardly 
surprising that this industry centered in New York City.  Given that the cloth came into 
that city, there was no reason to wait until the cloth reached its final destination before 
transforming it into shirts and pants.  There would be few advantages of making ready-to-
made clothes in disparate locations rather than in one centralized locale.   
 
As in the case of sugar, we must ask why manufacturing didn’t occur in the place where 
the raw material was first produced, which in this case would be England.  First, while 
England had a long history of cloth production, it had no history of producing ready-to-
make clothes.  No place did in 1830.  As a result, England had no natural advantage in 
this form of manufacturing.  New York manufacturers had the advantage of better 
knowledge of local demand, and could therefore cater to local tastes. They had access to 
relatively inexpensive labor from the increasing immigrant populations.  In short, there   20
were probably only mild advantages for centralizing ready-to-make clothing in New 
York rather than in London, but these small advantages were enough for this industry to 
be located on the American side of the Atlantic. 
 
Another important point about the garment trade, which helps to explain its 100 year 
dominance in New York, is that among manufacturing industries its need for physical 
space and power was quite mild.  Textile mills themselves were more efficient on a grand 
scale and in the first part of the 19
th century, the mills needed water power.  As a result, 
they were generally located away from urban areas along the banks of rivers like the 
Merrimack.  By contrast, the garment trade involved human beings and relatively small 
sewing machines.  In many cases, working women could contract work to be done in 
their own apartments.  This was the ideal industry for a city where land was expensive.   
 
Over the decades, New York developed an increasing human and physical infrastructure 
that supported the continuing presence of the garment trade even after the port’s primacy 
had passed.  Factories were built to cater to this trade. Singer came to New York to 
popularize his adaptation of the Howe sewing machine.  An entire section of the city (the 
Garment District) became oriented towards clothing production and a network of 
spatially proximate suppliers catered to this industry.  Perhaps even more importantly, the 
city’s industry attracted skilled workers who created a powerful agglomerating force that 
trained new workers and that attracted entrepreneurs.  There was an initial comparative 
advantage in manufacturing garments that came from New York’s port, but this 
comparative advantage produced an agglomeration that kept the industry in the city.   
 
The third largest manufacturing industry in the city in 1860 was printing and publishing.  
As late as the 1960s, publishing would be a distant second to garment manufacturing in 
its share of New York employment.  Only in the past 30 years has publishing passed 
garment manufacturing to become New York’s largest manufacturing industry.  Still, 
value added per worker was generally much higher in this industry than in the garment 
trade.  Moreover, the rise of New York publishing suggests the increasing role of New 
York as a city centered around the transfer of ideas.     21
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the early development of New York’s publishing trade was also 
connected to New York’s role as a port connecting America with the old world.  In the 
early nineteenth century “the big money, however, came from pirated copies of English 
authors (who didn’t yet have to be paid royalties because the United States government 
refused to as yet to recognize foreign copyrights)” (Burrows and Wallace, 1999, p. 441).  
As such, there was a huge advantage in this industry to being the first printer with a copy 
of the latest London sensation and “printers and book dealers in New York and 
Philadelphia competed furiously to bring out the first American editions of new English 
novels”   (Burrows and Wallace, 1999, p. 441). 
 
In this competitive atmosphere being at the center of the transatlantic trade offered a 
crucial advantage.  New York printers would have been capable of receiving new novels 
from England more quickly and regularly than their Philadelphia competitors because of 
the more frequent sea traffic between New York and Liverpool.  The closer connections 
between New York and England also ensured a steadier infusion of information about the 
latest books.  New York’s production advantages were complemented by their 
advantages in distributing to western consumers via the Erie Canal.   
 
As in the case of the garment trade, this initial advantage stuck because of specialized 
human capital and the advantages that came from local agglomeration economies.  New 
York attracted networks of suppliers and tradesmen who catered to the book producers.  
Book sellers from around the country would come to New York for book fairs to get 
access to the latest novels.  Eventually, the combination of high costs of land and low 
transport costs would push the printing presses themselves off of Manhattan, but to this 
day, there is a strong community of publishing houses in Manhattan connecting with 
authors and potential customers.  
 
While publishing English novels was one part of the early success of Manhattan 
publishing, the news industry was the other cornerstone of this industry.  Information 
extremely valuable to the growing mercantile economy and most of the early papers   22
focused on providing this information.  Scale economies in this industry also meant that 
New York had a disproportionate number of newspapers.  As the news became 
entertainment, and even entertainment for the masses, scale economies and New York’s 
large population ensured that the city would remain a center for newspaper production.   
 
The central lesson of the rise of New York in the early 19
th century is that manufacturing 
congregated around a port.  Changes in transportation technologies turned New York into 
the pre-eminent port of the United States.  This meant that raw inputs, including sugar, 
cloth and even English novels, came first into the city.  The first manufacturing industries 
were based on these raw inputs.  As scale economies rose with industrialization, 
production was increasingly centralized in the one place which welcomed the nation’s 
imports of these inputs.  
 
IV.  The Immigrant City: 1860-1920 
 
While New York City was the largest city in the country in 1860, it would continue to 
grow significantly over the next ninety years.  Over this period, the population of the city 
increased from 813 thousand to 7.9 million.  Much of this increase reflected the 
incorporation of the outer boroughs into New York City, but even Manhattan’s 
population continued to grow until 1920.  As shown in Figure 2, New York reached its 
peak relative to U.S. population as a whole in 1940 when 5.6 percent of the U.S. 
population lived in the city.  Manhattan was at its largest relative to the nation in 1910 
when almost three percent of the U.S. population lived in the island.   
 
During this amazing period, the basic structure of the New York economy was 
remarkably static.  The city remained primarily oriented towards manufacturing.  In 
1910, there were 873,497 employees in manufacturing, 40 percent of New York’s total.  
Trade and transportation had slightly more than 500,000 employees and domestic service 
included more than 330,000 workers.  The primary export industries were manufactured 
goods and the transportation sector.  New York’s port remained the biggest in the nation 
during this era.   23
 
Even more remarkably, the composition of manufacturing employment remained 
remarkably constant across industries.  The garment trade declined somewhat as a share 
of overall employment, but it remained New York’s dominant industry.  Sugar refining, 
printing, tobacco and bread all remained big products.  In the first half of the 19
th century, 
New York’s population explosion was connected with a radical restructuring of the city 
economy and the rise of manufacturing.  In the second half of the 19
th century, New 
York’s continuing population increases continued despite the fact that the basic structure 
of production remained remarkably constant.  
 
Still, there were trends that supported the growth of New York’s industries, particularly 
the garment trade, during this period.  Demand for finished clothing rose steadily as 
population and incomes rose in the country as a whole.  Input prices dropped 
significantly over the 1870-1890 period.  For example, the Warren and Pearson index of 
the wholesale cost of textiles shows a twenty percent decline relative to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index during these years.  As the South recovered from 
the Civil War, cotton particularly got cheaper and the cost per pound of raw cotton fell 
from 29 cents per pound in 1869 to 11 cents per pound in 1890.  Wool dropped from 90 
cents per pound in 1870 to less than 40 cents per pound in the mid 1890s.  
 
Despite the continuing strengths of New York City’s industries, it would be a mistake to 
ignore the explosion of immigration to America from Europe.  Figure 6 shows the levels 
of immigration into the United States by decadal frequencies between 1820 and 1970.  
Prior to 1841, annual immigration had always been below 90,000.  Except for the five 
years between 1849 and 1854, immigration never passed 250,000 people per year until 
1865.   
 
After the Civil War, as the figure shows, immigration began to soar.  There were almost 
400,000 thousand immigrants in 1870.  There were 450,000 immigrants in 1880, 1890 
and 1900 and between 1903 and 1914, there were almost 12 million immigrants.  The 
overwhelming share of these immigrants entered the United States through the port of   24
New York City.  Again, New York’s dominance as a port meant that it was the center for 
the import of America’s most important economic input: its labor force. 
 
The rise in immigration is probably best seen as the result of declining transportation 
costs in transatlantic passenger travel.  Just as improvements in shipping ensured that 
New York captured a larger share of the goods shipped into the U.S. in the early 19
th 
century, continuing improvements in sea travel meant that New York was able to keep a 
hold on an increasingly large group of immigrants.  These reductions in travel costs were 
accompanied by political problems in European countries like Russia that terrorized their 
Jewish citizens with Pogroms and by a continuing gap between high American wages and 
worse economic prospects in the poorer European countries.  Accompanying these 
factors was the phenomenon of chain migration, where an initial group of immigrants 
made it socially more comfortable for later immigrants to follow.   
 
The vast number of immigrants that stayed in New York, and that continue to settle (at 
least temporarily) in the city can be understood as the result of four different factors.  
First, transportation costs for internal transport within the U.S. were still high enough so 
that it was cheaper to just stay in New York.  This factor would have been particularly 
important for immigrants from poorer countries such as Italy, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, who were frequently stretched to their financial limits by the transatlantic journey 
itself.  After making the long and costly trip across the ocean, many immigrants simply 
did not want to spend the time and money to travel further.   
 
Second, New York’s economy may have kept its basic structure over this time period, but 
it still showed a remarkable ability to increase its scale with the influx of new labor.  The 
rising American population meant that demand for garments continued to rise and there 
was nothing intrinsic to the production process that limited even more production within 
the city.  The garment industry was also special in that it relied on skills that were more 
prevalent among immigrants than the skills required in more advanced industries.   
   25
Third, improvements in transportation technologies for within city transport increasingly 
made the development out of the boroughs feasible.  New York began its omnibus routes 
in the 1820s.  Streetcars and the subway line soon followed.  The introduction of the 
automobile was soon accompanied by the introduction of the bus.  Public transportation 
made it possible for new immigrants to occupy the outlying boroughs and commute into 
the city.   
 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the city itself acquired considerable immigrant-
specific social and political infrastructure that made New York (and continues to make 
the city) a magnet for immigration.  The most important form of this infrastructure may 
be large communities of immigrants from specific countries.  These communities allowed 
new immigrants to come to New York but continue to speak their own language.  In these 
areas, suppliers provided commodities that were closer to those that the immigrants had 
consumed in their home countries.  It was certainly easier for a Jewish orthodox 
immigrant to keep Kosher in the lower east side of Manhattan than in rural Minnesota.   
 
Immigrants provided the voting base for Tammany Hall during this time period and as a 
result city services were oriented towards immigrant needs.  This meant that judges were 
quick to approve naturalization and that the city machine stood ready to provide 
patronage and emergency supplies to new arrivals.  Churches and synagogues were built 
to cater to the growing immigrant population.  Indeed, New York had been an immigrant 
town long before the Civil War, so there was a long tradition of providing economic 
services and employment to new arrivals.   
 
Did the flow of immigrants in the late 19
th century mean that New York City’s labor 
supply was outstripping labor demand?  Long time series on wages for New York City 
are not available, so Figure 7 shows the time path of average wages for production 
workers in manufacturing for New York State and the nation as a whole.  The wages in 
the figure are all in 2005 dollars.  If New York’s growth reflects primarily labor supply, 
we should expect wages in New York to be falling relative to wages in the nation as a   26
whole.  If New York’s growth reflects labor demand we should expect wages in New 
York to be increasing.   
 
Figure 7 shows that from 1870 to 1890, manufacturing wages were rising in the U.S. as a 
whole and New York State wage premium increased from seven percent to thirteen 
percent.  Labor supply may have been increasing during this period, but labor demand in 
both New York and the nation was increasing even faster.  From 1890 to 1914, real 
manufacturing wages in New York State declined and the New York State wage 
premium fall back to only three percent.  This period of declining real wages in the state 
corresponds with the period where immigration truly exploded.   These figures suggest 
that during the first 25 years after the Civil War, labor demand increases outpaced labor 
supply, especially in New York, perhaps as a result of declining costs of inputs and rising 
demand in the country as a whole. Changes in transportation technology made it 
increasingly possible for manufacturers to locate in the city and sell their wares 
throughout the world.  New industrial technologies and products also strengthened the 
local economy.  New York remained innovative and this helped to ensure that rising 
population levels didn’t push wages down precipitously. 
 
But between 1890 and 1914, the growth of the city had more to do with the immigrant 
shock to labor supply than with increases in labor demand.  Nonetheless, the driving 
force behind the rise of New York City population, and the continuing growth of the 
city’s economy, was the steady influx of immigrants between 1890 and 1920.  These 
immigrants came to America because of higher wages, safety and cheaper ocean travel.  
They stayed in New York for the same reasons that cotton and sugar were processed in 
the city, to save transportation costs and because New York specialized in dealing with 
imports.  
 
V.  The Rise of the Information City: 1920-2000 
 
New York’s immigrant boom ended with the national restriction on immigration in 1921.  
The quota law drove immigration down significantly and ended the pre-war explosion of   27
immigration into the island of Manhattan.  For the first time in decades, the foreign born 
would represent a declining share of New York’s population.   
 
This negative shock was accompanied by a pair of technological shocks that would hurt 
almost all of America’s larger cities.  First, the rise of the automobile made cities, like 
New York, that had been built around older transportation technologies somewhat 
obsolete.  Cars, at least in low density car-oriented areas, are much faster means of 
transportation than public transportation.  The average commute by car is 23 minutes in 
the U.S.  The average commute by public transportation is 47 minutes.  New York and 
other cities had built at higher densities to take advantage of public transportation and to 
allow travelers to walk from public transport stops to their final destination.  Car-based 
communities are built at much lower densities to allow cars to drive without congestion 
and to allow consumers to consume more land.  
 
Second, the rise of the truck led to a spectacular decline in transportation costs and a 
decline in the need for high density work environments.  Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) 
estimate that the real cost of transportation declined by 95 percent over the 20
th century.  
As such, cities like New York that were built to take advantage of transportation 
technologies lost this comparative advantage.  Moreover, the truck doesn’t require the 
same centralized infrastructure as the older form of shipping technology.  This meant that 
manufacturing no longer needed to cluster around a port or a train station.  Over the 20
th 
century, manufacturing left large cities and is now generally located in medium density 
countries (Glaeser, 2005).  Figure 8 shows a long time series of the share of national 
manufacturing employment that was located in New York State.  Figure 9 shows the 
decline over manufacturing in New York City as a whole and in Manhattan after 1949.  
 
These shocks impacted New York City just as they hit all of America’s major cities.  
Table 1 shows the time path of population levels (after 1950) for the ten largest cities in 
the United States in 1930.  Every city but Los Angeles lost population in the 1950s and 
the 1970s.  Every city but New York and Los Angeles lost population in the 1960s.  
Every city but New York, Boston and Los Angeles lost population in the 1980s.  In the   28
1990s, New York, Chicago, Boston and Los Angeles all managed to lose population.  
These figures show the generally declining period that all major cities had after the 
Second World War as transportation technologies made high density living in traditional 
manufacturing towns relatively much less attractive. 
 
Table 1 makes it clear that the remarkable thing about New York City is not its post-war 
decline, but rather its success relative to other older cities.  Only in the 1970s did New 
York lose more than one percent of its population. Even in that decade, it lost the least 
population of any of these cities (again except for Los Angeles). New York oriented 
writers often focus on the big problems of the city during the 1970s, but such a focus 
ignores the fact that almost every other traditional city did far worse during this period.  
The era of Lindsay and Beam may have had its problems, but New York was in much 
better shape than either Detroit or Philadelphia during the same time period.  
 
After the Second World War, New York had many of the same problems that plagued the 
other large cities.  Crime skyrocketed between 1960 and 1975, and the increase in crime 
made wider social problems more visible.  Bad urban governance, which in most cases 
had been going on for decades, became more obvious during a period of urban decline 
when steadily increasing tax receipts couldn’t hide waste and mismanagement.   
Furthermore, decaying infrastructure also made the city seem grungy. 
 
But New York survived these problems better than its peers mainly because its economy 
remained more robust.    While the economies of Philadelphia, Detroit and Pittsburgh 
never truly survived the collapse of local manufacturing, New York (like Boston) has 
reinvented itself over the last 80 years as a service city that has become increasingly 
oriented around finance and corporate management.  New York continues to boom 
through this day primarily because of finance and business services. 
 
Table 2a shows the distribution of employment in Manhattan in 2002.  28 percent of the 
payroll of the city is in a single three digit industry: security, commodity contracts and 
like activity.  This level of concentration is higher even than the commitment of the city   29
to the garment trade during the height of that industry.  Another 28.5 percent of total 
payroll is in three other industries: business, scientific and services (mostly lawyers and 
accountants), credit intermediation and company management.  Together, these four 
industries account for 56.6 percent of total payroll in the isle of Manhattan.  When 
Benjamin Chinitz (1961) compared agglomeration in New York and Pittsburgh, he 
emphasized the remarkably diverse nature of the New York economy.  This is no longer 
the case.  Manhattan employment is remarkably depended on finance, business 
management and business services. 
 
This is not true in the outlying boroughs that are primarily in non-traded service sectors.  
Tables 2b and 2c show the importance of health care, for example, in the economies of 
Queens and Brooklyn.  Both boroughs also have export sectors, such as Queens’ airport 
industry, but these are both much smaller economic areas and are much more oriented 
towards providing services towards the residents of the greater New York area.   
 
New York’s move into finance and management is not really paralleled by any of the 
other older cities.  Perhaps the closest parallel to New York is Chicago which, during the 
last decade, has somewhat remade itself around business services.  Boston’s post-1980 
renaissance is completely different and should be seen as the result of small scale 
entrepreneurship in a number of disparate, high human capital sectors.  The other large 
cities are still in decline and cannot be said to have found any meaningful replacement for 
the manufacturing firms that once employed thousands of their citizens. 
 
The success of New York as a financial city suggests three questions.  How did New 
York become the financial capital of the world?  Why has New York’s dominance 
managed to expand in the modern era?  Will New York manage to continue to survive on 
the basis of its financial industries? 
 
Unsurprisingly, the origins of New York’s financial community lie in its role as a port.  
The financial sector on Wall Street has its origins as an organization designed around 
sharing risk on sea voyages.  This financial community branched into government   30
securities in the 1790s.  In the early 19
th century, New York was a close rival to 
Philadelphia as a center for trading stocks and bonds.  
 
Eventually, New York replaced Philadelphia for at least three reasons.  New York’s 
greater connection to England became increasingly important in the late 19
th century as 
English capital financed American development.  New York’s greater size meant that 
there were more companies in New York which had a direct, local market for financing.  
Finally, the great incentive to agglomerate in finance comes from the desire for the latest 
information.  In no other industry are the returns to knowing the latest fact greater, this 
meant that once New York had a slight edge, this slight edge turned into a complete 
preponderance as the financial community came to the city to get access to the latest 
information.   
 
The rise to world dominance for New York’s financial community was a 20
th century 
phenomenon that followed the decline of New York as a port.  Instead, there are two 
major agglomeration economies at work.  First, the role of the dense city as a center for 
idea flows.  The high value of knowledge meant that being in the city was particularly 
valuable.  It may even be that New York’s high density levels, which ended up being 
unattractive for most manufacturing firms, helped New York finance continue to thrive 
because those high density levels are particularly conducive to chance meetings, regular 
exchanges of new ideas and the general flow of information.  
 
Figure 10 shows the rising share of U.S. and New York City employment in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate.  The concentration of New York City in this sector is much 
less than the concentration of Manhattan in this sector, and the concentration of 
employment is much less than the concentration by payroll.  Nonetheless, the city has 
much more of its employment in this area than the U.S. did as a whole.  Furthermore, 
both the city and national data show that this sector is becoming increasing employment.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the decade in which the share of NYC employment in this sector 
increased the most was the 1970s.  In 1970, 7.4 percent of the city’s employment was in 
this sector and by 1980, 12 percent of employment was in this sector.  This change   31
reflected both the increase of finance and the decline of other industries, like 
manufacturing.  As such, it may make sense to date New York’s dependence on this 
sector to 1980.   
 
New York’s high density levels and massive scale drove its success as a center of 
business services.  The costs of delivering manufactured goods depends only on 
transportation technology, but the cost of delivering services depends both on technology 
and on the value of the time involved by the participants in the transaction.  Because 
services are by definition face-to-face, during an era of rising wages, there is an increased 
incentive to agglomerate these activities.  This simple argument can explain why New 
York was able to thrive at the same time its manufacturing base was fleeing.  Services 
replaced manufacturing because of the transportation cost advantages of locating in a 
large, dense city.   
 
The flow of information and the ability to buy and sell business services are the reasons 
why Manhattan has survived as the center of world finance.  But if finance had remained 
at its 1940 level, this would have had no effect on the long run fortunes of New York.  
The city’s great fortune was that at the same time that it was suffering from an exodus of 
the garment trade, the international financial sector boomed.  Individuals saved and 
invested more.  Improvements in communication technology and changes in regulation 
made it increasingly attractive for people to get involved in New York’s formal economic 
markets.  Firms had an ongoing demand for financing.  The industry soared and New 
York was its center.   
 
However, it is less obvious that this trend will continue.  New York City is still the 
epicenter for the transmission of new ideas in finance, but the past 15 years has seen a 
remarkable growth of cutting edge financial institutions in the car-oriented edge cities 
surrounding the metropolis. Some of the more famous and infamous financial market 
participants have been located far away from Manhattan (Warren Buffett in Omaha, Peter 
Lynch in Boston, Michael Milken in Los Angeles).   As important as face-to-face contact   32
appears to be, information technologies have made major inroads and the continuing 
economic vitality of New York City is less obvious than it was 15 years ago. 
 
The one final point on the future of New York which is worthwhile emphasizing is that 
the city has recently made remarkable progress in changing itself from a relatively 
unattractive to a relatively attractive place to live.  In 1970, real wages in New York were 
quite high and this was necessary to compensate workers for crime and other problems 
associated with the city. In 2000, real wages are much lower.  Nominal wages have risen, 
reflecting in part the continuing vitality of the financial sector, but prices have risen even 
more.  This rise in real wages relates to the increasing demand for New York as a 
consumer city.  If the city is able to continue to attract financial professionals who want 
the excitement of New York, then it can thrive from labor supply just as it did during the 
period of immigration during the late 19
th century.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
In Glaeser (2005), I argued that the long term success of Boston reflects a process of 
continual reinvention where smart entrepreneurs react to a continuing set of crises by 
discovering new ways to turn a profit and still live in that city.  New York’s history is far 
more continuous, more stable and more triumphant.  The city’s rise to dominance occurs 
during the early 19
th century and is driven primarily by its advantages as a port.  
Manufacturing, immigration and even finance followed from maritime supremacy.  The 
ultimate success of New York comes from its role as the center of the global trading 
network.    
 
There are several lessons for urban and regional economics from the economic history of 
New York City.  First, there is something to be said for geographic determinism.  New 
York City should have had the biggest harbor and it did.  But we cannot understand the 
full extent of New York’s dominance without understanding that agglomeration 
economies and New York’s rise to dominance as a port are connected to the increasing 
scale of ships and the benefits of specialization.    33
 
A second lesson of New York is that transportation costs really matter.  The city’s port 
status obviously came about in large part because of these advantages, but its role as a 
center for immigration and as a sugar refinery also came in large part because of costs 
savings that were the result of reducing transportation costs.  This point may be less 
relevant today in the manufacturing sector, but the continuing importance of 
transportation costs in business services helps to explain New York’s continuing strength 
in that area.  
 
A third lesson is the obvious importance of what Henderson (1977) calls localization 
economies.  Generally speaking, every industry has some form of very specific industry 
related needs which were met by agglomerating New York.  Indeed, even the 
concentration of immigrants tends to suggest a benefit from very particular groups of 
immigrants locating near one another.  These agglomeration economies helped ensure 
that initial transportation cost based agglomerations didn’t disappear as transportation 
costs fell. 
 
A fourth and final lesson is that New York’s success for centuries has been connected to 
its edge as an idea city.  Publishing centered in New York because people could read the 
latest books from England more quickly there.  Sugar refining and the garment trade were 
located in New York, as opposed to the places that produced primary products, in part 
because of information gains from locating in New York.  Finally, and most 
spectacularly, for almost 200 years, the success of the New York financial sector owes a 
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Figure 1: New York City and Manhattan Population
Year
 NYC Population  Manhattan Population







Source: For City Population 1790-1990: http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html. 
For Borough Population 1900-1990:  http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ny190090.txt. 
 
Figure 2: New York City and Manhattan Population
Year
 NYC Population/US Population  Manhattan Relative Population































Figure 3: Growth Rates of New York City by Decade
Year
























Source: United States Census of Population 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html. 
 
Figure 4: Exports from Principal Ports 1821-1860
Year
 NYC Exports  Boston Exports
 Phil. Exports  N. Orleans Exports






Source: Historical Statistics of the United States.   37
Figure 5: Exports and Imports New York and New Orleans
Year
 NYC Exports  N. Orleans Exports
 NYC Imports  N. Orleans Imports





























Figure 6: Immigration to the United States
Year





Source: Historical Statistics of the United States.   38
Figure 7: Manufacturing Wages in NY State and the U.S.
Year




































Figure 8: NY State Manufacturing Employment Relative to the U.S.
Year























Source: United States Census of Population and United States Manufacturing Census. 
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Figure 9: Manufacturing Employment over Time
Year
 Manufacturing Emp. NYC  Manufacturing Emp. Manhattan











Figure 10: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate in NYC and the US
Year
 FIRE as a share of USA Emp.  FIRE as a share of NYC Emp.






Source: United States Census of Population.   40
 
Table 1 – Growth in Top 10 Cities by 1930 Population 




  1930 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000  2000 
New York City, NY  6,930,446  -0.01  0.01  -0.10  0.04  0.09  8,008,278 
Chicago,  IL  3,376,438 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.07  0.04  2,896,016 
Philadelphia,  PA  1,950,961 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.04  1,517,550 
Detroit,  MI  1,568,662 -0.10 -0.09 -0.20 -0.15 -0.07  951,270 
Los  Angeles,  CA  1,238,048 0.26 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.06  3,694,820 
Cleveland,  OH  900,429 -0.04 -0.14 -0.24 -0.12 -0.05  478,403 
St.  Louis,  MO  821,960 -0.12 -0.17 -0.27 -0.12 -0.12  348,189 
Baltimore,  MD  804,874 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.06 -0.12  651,154 
Boston,  MA  781,188  -0.13  -0.08  -0.12 0.02 0.03  589,141 
Pittsburgh, PA  669,817  -0.11  -0.14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10  334,563     
United  States  151,325,798 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.13  281,421,906 
Note:  All data comes from U.S. Census of Population. 
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Table 2a: Employment in Manhattan 2002 
Three Digit Industry Name 
 











Professional, Scientific and  
Technical Services (541)  261,157  0.131  21,389,318  0.143  81,902 
Security, Commodity Contracts 
and like activity 
(523) 210,960  0.106  42,107,893  0.281  199,601 
 
Administrative and Support 
Services (561)  142,796 0.072  5,521,745  0.037  38,669 
 
Food Services and Drinking 
Places(722)  107,778 0.054  2,208,254  0.015  20,489 
 
 
Educational Services (611)  94,945 0.048  3,764,351  0.025  39,648 
 
Credit Intermediation and Related 
Activites (522)  90,105 0.045  11,191,706  0.075  124,207 
 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises (551)  84,821 0.043  10,059,521  0.067  118,597 
 
 
Hospitals (622)   73,230 0.037  4,320,883  0.029  59,004 
Religious, Grantmaking, Civil, 
Professional and like Activities 
(813) 67,823  0.034  2,955,000  0.020  43,569 
 
Ambulatory Health Care Services 
(621) 67,399  0.034  2,660,933  0.018  39,480 
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Table 2b: Employment in Brooklyn 2002 
Three Digit Industry Name 
 











Ambulatory and Health Care 
Services (621)  54,537  0.125  1,682,173  0.121  30,845 
 
 
Hospitals (622)  45,098  0.103  2,315,354  0.166  51,341 
 
 
Social Assistance (624)  21,891  0.050  498,796  0.036  22,785 
 
 
Educational Services (611)  21,145 0.049  500,278  0.036  23,659 
 
Food Services and Drinking 
Places (722)  18,395 0.042  261,438  0.019  14,212 
 
Administrative and Support 
Services (561)  17,997 0.041  434,805  0.031  24,160 
 
Nursing and Residential Care 
Facilities (623)  16,849 0.038  542,854  0.039  32,219 
 
Special Trade Contractors (235)   14,976  0.034  613,787  0.044  40,985 
 
Wholesale Trade, Nondurable 
Goods (422)  14,852  0.034  492,365  0.035  33,151 
 
Professional, Scientific & 
Technical Services (541)  14,474  0.033  497,593  0.036  34,378 
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Table 2c: Employment in Queens 2002 
Three Digit Industry Name 
 











Ambulatory and Health Care 
Services (621)  37,272  0.080  1,146,772  0.068332  30,768 
 
Special Trade Contractors (235)  29,330 0.063  1,541,310  0.091841  52,551 
 
 
Air Transportation (481)  27,502  0.059  1,448,255  0.086296  52,660 
 
Food Services and Drinking 
Places (722)  26,680  0.057  401,915 0.023949  15,064 
 
 
Hospitals (622)  24,729  0.053  1,288,459  0.076774  52,103 
 
Administrative and Support 
Services (561)  21,818  0.047  506,225  0.030164  23,202 
 
Nursing and Residential Care 
Facilities (623)  16,215  0.035  537,169  0.032008  33,128 
 
Professional, Scientific & 
Technical Services (541)  14,329  0.031  477,570  0.028457  33,329 
 
Wholesale Trade, Durable 
Goods (421)  13,661  0.029  601,030  0.035813  43,996 
 
 
Educational Services (611)  13,513 0.029  389,995  0.023238  28,861 
Source: 2002 County Business Patterns for Queens, NY. 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/map/02data/36/081.txt  
 
 
 